The application of statutory limitation periods to breach of trust and other equitable claims is often unclear, and the operation of the doctrine of laches is likewise far from transparent. This article seeks to clarify the key features of both, focusing on those aspects most likely to give rise to difficulties: equitable property rights, the role of unconscionability, and the interaction of statutory limitation and laches, both in cases where laches may provide a good defence before the statutory time limit has expired, and where the statutory exclusion of any limitation period might be understood as precluding a laches defence.
The Chancery Division of the High Court, now to be found sitting in the strikingly modern surroundings of the Rolls Building, feels like it has come a long way from the Dickensian fogs of Jarndyce v Jarndyce.
1 But issues of delay still bedevil trusts litigation, with proceedings sometimes first begun many years after the events with which they are concerned. It is sometimes supposed that courts concerned primarily with the machinations of equity will be less concerned with delay than pernickety common lawyers, and even that there are no time limits at all in equity and trusts cases. But these beliefs are misconceived: limitation periods do apply, and equity, whilst doubtless more flexible in its approach through the doctrine of laches, can flex to severity as well as to leniency. The interaction between laches and statutory limitation is still less understood. The purpose of this article is to clarify the crucial elements of both limitation and laches, and to consider some of the key issues arising out of them, and out of the interaction between them.
But issues of delay still bedevil trusts litigation, with proceedings sometimes first begun many years after the events with which they are concerned
Statutory limitation
Equity's relationship with statutory limitation periods has always been both confused and confusing. Whilst the Limitation Act 1980 does make some provision for trusts claims, 2 it does so only to a limited extent:
some types of claim have a prescribed limitation period, others are specifically designated as having no limitation period. But since limitation is a creature purely of statute, the latter conclusion applies not only to those claims so identified, but to any claim not within the first category. The starting point must be the principal limitation period for trusts claims prescribed by Section 21(3) of the Act: 6 years from accrual of the cause of action, the same period as is prescribed for actions in contract. 3 This applies to any 'action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust'. 4 But it does not apply to two important types of claim, and it is perhaps from the breadth of these that the 'no limitation period in trusts' myth is derived. First, there will be no limitation period where the claim is brought by a trust beneficiary 'in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy'. 5 Whilst this is an important exception to the general six-year period, it is narrower than it appears. In particular, it applies only to trustees of express trusts, and to others, such as trustees de son tort and agents agreeing to receive trust property, 6 who voluntarily assume fiduciary obligations. Despite the apparent breadth of the words 'in respect of' it does not apply, for example, to a third party who assists in a fraudulent breach of trust. 7 Secondly, there will be no applicable limitation period where the beneficiary's claim is brought to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use. 8 Claims which fall within none of these categories are also free of statutory limitation, though by omission rather than express exclusion. 9 For example, it has long been the law that there is no limitation period at all in respect of a claim to an account based upon a fiduciary relationship, 10 where no breach of trust is alleged.
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Equity's relationship with statutory limitation periods has always been both confused and confusing
There will be no limitation period where the claim is brought by a trust beneficiary 'in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy'
Equity goes further, too, and does not restrict itself simply to applying the Limitation Act as enacted. Section 36 disapplies the key provisions of the Act in so far as they would otherwise apply to claims for 'equitable relief', such as specific performance or an injunction, except in so far as they would have been applied by analogy prior to the Limitation Act 1939 coming into force. Whether or not this is simply 'an illustration of the maxim that equity follows the law'
12 it is clear that this long-standing doctrine 13 remains of importance. For example, there is no provision in section 21 of the Act for a trust claim which is not 'an action by a beneficiary'. Yet a claim typically seen as belonging to a beneficiary might equally be brought by a trustee, against another trustee or a third party. 14 This is particularly likely if the beneficiaries are minors or unborn, or where the trust is for a large discretionary class. 15 It would be absurd if, say, a breach of trust claim against a former trustee would be subject to a six-year limitation period if brought by a beneficiary, but to no limitation period at all if brought by a current trustee. The authors of Underhill and Hayton must surely be correct to conclude that the Court would simply apply the six year period by analogy. 16 Equitable analogy apart, these limitation periods all share some important common features. They are creatures of statute alone. They are immutable, except in so far as the Act itself provides for them to be extended in restricted and carefully delineated circumstances. 17 They are concerned solely with the effluxion of time, and not with the merits or morality of the claim or the parties. They do not engage at all with whether the passage of time has had any impact on the parties or the proposed litigation, and once expired, they present a usually insurmountable barrier. Through such inflexibility they do, however, afford a high degree of certainty. First and foremost, it is trite equity that a claimant who seeks relief must do so promptly
Defining laches
It is in this dual consideration of first, the promptness and diligence with which a claim has been brought, and secondly, whether the claimant has acted inequitably, that the doctrine of laches is to be found.
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The most authoritative statement of principle is contained in the judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Selborne in Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd:
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Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of 17. Such as in cases of fraud, concealment and mistake, when the limitation period will not start to run until the claimant has discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud, concealment or mistake: Limitation Act 1980, s 32. Of course, most fraud claims will not be subject to any limitation period at all, so long as they are brought against a trustee: see text to n 5 and following.
18. In my view, the more modern approach should not require an inquiry as to whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of a preconceived formula derived from earlier cases. The inquiry should require a broad approach, directed to ascertaining whether it would in all the circumstances be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to assert his beneficial right. No doubt the circumstances which gave rise to a particular result in the decided cases are relevant to the question whether or not it would be conscionable or unconscionable for the relief to be asserted, but each case has to be decided on its facts applying the broad approach.
(emphasis added)
The Court will refuse a remedy where it would be practically unjust to give one Whereas in the context of laches, it is the claimant's inaction which is assessed, in the context of whether he should be awarded the equitable (and therefore usually discretionary) relief he seeks. The cases do provide some guidance as to the assessment of unconscionability in the context of laches. Factors to be taken into account include the period of the delay, the extent to which the defendant's position has been prejudiced by the delay and the extent to which that prejudice was caused by the actions of the plaintiff. 33 The hallmarks of unconscionability appear to be either (i) prejudice to the defendant, such as where evidence has been lost or destroyed before proceedings commence 34 or (ii) an unfair windfall to the claimant. Of course in many cases, prejudice to the defendant and a windfall to the claimant may simply be opposite sides of the same coin.
The hallmarks of unconscionability appear to be either (i) prejudice to the defendants, such as where evidence has been lost or destroyed before proceedings commence or (ii) an unfair windfall to the claimant
Equitable property
One particular area of controversy has been the extent to which laches can be relied upon to defeat claims to ownership of equitable property. In Patel v Shah 35 the Court of Appeal was urged to distinguish claims to discretionary equitable remedies, in respect of which it was conceded that laches could operate as a complete defence, from claims to enforce equitable property rights, in relation to which it was said that equity would not go so far as to deprive the owner of all relief, and so in effect all rights to his property. 36 The
Court of Appeal was unwilling to go quite so far as to rule out a laches defence in property cases, and instead drew a fragile distinction between 'traditional' and 'commercial' trusts. 37 In a 'traditional' trust, the beneficiary is simply the recipient of a gift. 
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Articlethe defendant 'is entitled to play possum in the hope that the plaintiff will make a mistake and fail to commence proceedings before the statutory time limit is breached.' 46 Perhaps most importantly, mere delay is not generally enough to constitute laches; 47 some action or inaction which would make it unconscionable to proceed must always be established.
Unlike statutory limitation, laches is factsensitive, and responds to the conduct of the parties
The interaction of laches and limitation
It will be apparent that laches and statutory limitation must overlap. A trustee defending a breach of trust claim brought by a beneficiary may be able to invoke both the elapse of six years since the breach 48 as well as any conduct of the beneficiary which would make it unconscionable now to pursue his claim. But the precise interaction between the two sets of very different rules has always been somewhat unclear. The structure of the Limitation Act 1980 gives rise to three possibilities. The first and most straightforward situation is where there is no applicable statutory limitation period. 49 In that case, there can be no objection to the full application of laches in the ordinary way, since the statute has nothing to say. The second, and more obviously difficult, case is where there is a statutory limitation period, usually the six-year period prescribed by Section 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. On one view, laches is simply equity's default position, and if Parliament has intervened to specify a limitation period more precisely, the question of delay should be governed exclusively by the statute. This appears to have been the approach adopted by Wilberforce J in Re Pauling's Settlement Trusts, 50 in which he held that the situation in that case was governed by Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1939 (the predecessor to Section 21 of the 1980 Act), and As the law stands, therefore, it would be theoretically possible to invoke laches as a defence even before the expiry of the six-year statutory limitation period. It is likely to be a rare case, however, in which a Court can be persuaded that prejudice arising simply from the effluxion of time is such as to render it unconscionable for the claimant to bring proceedings, when Parliament has ordained that the Claimant may have a full six years in which to do so. Something more will invariably be required.
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As the law stands, therefore, it would be theoretically possible to invoke laches as a defence even before the expiry of the six-year statutory limitation period
The third, and most difficult, case is where there is no statutory limitation period, not merely because none is provided for (as in the first case), but because the Limitation Act 1980 specifically provides that there shall be no such limitation period, even if the six-year period would otherwise apply. This will primarily encompass claims against an express trustee based on fraud or the retention or conversion of trust property. 57 One approach would be to see the The same must logically apply to Section 21(1)(a) too.
Conclusion
Limitation periods in respect of trusts and other claims in equity can be difficult to ascertain. The operation of the Limitation Act 1980 is far from straightforward, and the doctrine of laches is so flexible as to be profoundly unpredictable. The interaction of the two has produced even more difficult problems. But a sound understanding of the key principles is essential if difficulties are to be avoided. As is so often the case in equity, 65 the pana-
